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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
The state appeals from the district court's order suppressing evidence of 
driving under the influence. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of the Proceedinqs 
The state charged Scott with DUI (second offense). (R., p. 20.) Scott 
moved to suppress the evidence against him. (R., p. 37.) The magistrate found 
the facts to be as follows: 
Officer Hagstrom with the Sandpoint City Police Department 
was on patrol during the early morning hours of Saturday, 
December 29, 2007. There was approximately 4 inches of new 
snow on the roadways and it was snowing hard at the time. Officer 
Hagstrom pulled up behind a pickup at the corner of Division Street 
and Pine Street in the City of Sandpoint. 
The pickup had stopped at the stop sign at Division Street. It 
then crossed Division Street and accelerated. Officer Hagstrom 
remained parked at Division Street and used his radar to confirm 
that :he pickup was traveling at 32 miles per hour in a posted 25 
mile per hour zone. The officer had seen the pickup parked in 
downtown Sandpoint earlier, but did not know who owned the 
pickup, nor how many people were in the pickup at the time he 
observed it on Pine Street. 
The pickup had two snowmobiles in the bed of the pickup 
and had no difficulty traveling on the snowy roads. The officer did 
not observe any erratic driving. 
The officer was driving a rear-wheel drive patrol car and did 
have difficulty accelerating to catch up with the pickup. 
The officer observed the pickup speeding well within the city 
limits of Sandpoint, followed the pickup for a significant distance 
within the city limits,['] and continued to follow the pickup 
(separated by a substantial distance) until the pickup was 
approximately one mile outside the city limits of Sandpoint and 
turning onto Syringa road. At that time the officer turned on his 
vehicle's emergency lights. The pickup stopped immediately. 
During the ensuing contact between the officer and the defendant, 
who was the driver of the pickup, the officer concluded that the 
defendant was under the influence of alcohol and arrested the 
defendant. The officer did not contact a county deputy. 
(R., pp. 46-47.) The court then framed the issue before it as follows: 
The defendant is not contesting that after the stop the officer 
had probable cause to believe the defendant was operating a motor 
vehicle while under the influence of alcohol, but is arguing that the 
officer did not have jurisdiction to follow the pickup outside the City 
of Sandpoint and stop the vehicle for the trafiic infraction of 
speeding. 
(R., p. 47.) The magistrate concluded that because the officer had not turned on 
his overhead lights while within the city limits the stop was invalid and the 
evidence gathered as a result of the stop had to be suppressed. (R., pp. 47-49.) 
The state appealed the magistrate's order to the district court. (R., pp. 50- 
5 . )  The district court affiimed on the same basis articulated by the magistrate 
(R., pp. 79-88) and the state appealed to this Court (R., pp. 89-92). 
' The officer testified that he did not activate his lights earlier because he feared 
that because his vehicle was having trouble with the snow, but the pickup was 
not, that the pickup would be able to successfully flee. (Tr., p. 7, Ls. 12-24; p. 14, 
Ls. 6-16; p. 15, Ls. 13-21 .) 
Did the district court err in affirming the magistrate's order suppressing 
evidence because the stop was legal under Idaho statutes and because, even if 
illegal under the statutes, there was no violation of Scott's constitutional rights 
and therefore no grounds for suppression of evidence? 
ARGUMENT 
The Lower Courts Erred Because The Stop Was Leaal Under ldaho Statutes And 
Because, Even If Illegal Under The Statutes, There Was No Violation Of Scott's 
Constitutional Riqhts And Therefore No Grounds For Suppression Of Evidence 
A. Introduction 
Scott did not claim that his detention violated the Constitution. Rather, he 
admitted the officer had at least reasonable suspicion to justify the detention. 
(a Tr., p. I I, Ls. 21-22 (speed limit is 25 within city limits); p. 18, Ls. 1-3 (Scott 
admitted accelerating to 32 miles per hour); p. 20, Ls. 13-14 (counsel admitted 
officer observed infraction within city limits).) Scott claimed only that the stop 
violated the ldaho Code sections establishing the officer's limited authority to act 
outside the physical boundaries of his jurisdiction. (Tr., p. 20, L. 10 - p. 22, L. 7; 
R., p. 47.) Likewise, the magistrate suppressed the evidence finding a violation 
of the ldaho Code but not even mentioning the Constitution. (R., pp. 46-49.) 
The district court erred in affirming the suppression of evidence for two 
reasons. First, the magistrate erred by concluding that the traffic stop conducted 
by the officer was prohibited by the ldaho Code. Second, even if the stop 
somehow violated the ldaho Code the magistrate erred by suppressing because 
there was no constitutional violation. 
B. Standard Of Review 
On review of a decision rendered by a district court in its intermediate 
appellate capacity, the reviewing court "directly review[s] the district court's 
decision." State v. DeWitt, 145 ldaho 709, 711, 184 P.3d 215, 217 (Ct. App. 
2008) (citing Losser v. Bradstreet, 145 ldaho 670, 183 P.3d 758 (2008)). The 
appellate court "examine[s] the magistrate record to determine whether there is 
substantial and competent evidence to support the magistrate's findings of fact 
and whether the magistrate's conclusions of law follow from those findings." kl. 
On appeal from the ruling on a motion to suppress, the appellate court 
defers to the trial court's findings of fact unless clearly erroneous but exercises 
free review of the trial court's determination as to whether constitutional 
standards have been satisfied in light of the facts. State v. Fees, 140 ldaho 81, 
84, 90 P.3d 306, ..- 399 (2004). The interpretation and construction of a statute 
present questions of law over which the appellate court exercises free review. 
State v. Thompson, 140 ldaho 796, 798, 102 P.3d 1 115, 1 I 1  7 (2004). 
C. Officer Haqstrom Violated No State Statute In Conductinq The Traffic Stop 
The magistrate concluded that Officer Hagstrom had violated provisions of 
the ldaho Code controlling the authority of city police officers when he conducted 
the tisffc stop of Scof? for speeding. Review of the appficable statutes shows 
this conclusion to be in error. 
The interpretation of a statute must begin with the literal words of a 
statute. State v. Schwarlz, 139 ldaho 360, 362, 79 P.3d 719, 721 (2003). Those 
words must be given their plain, usual, and ordinary meaning and the statute 
must be construed as a whole. !&. Where the language of a statute is plain and 
unambiguous, the court must give effect to the statute as written, without 
engaging in statutory construction. State v. Rhode, 133 ldaho 459, 462, 988 
P.2d 685, 688 (1999). The court assumes that the legislature meant what is 
clearly stated in the statute, "[u]nless the result is palpably absurd." m, 133 
ldaho at 462,988 P.2d at 688. 
Moreover, in interpreting a statute, the Court must "seek a sensible 
construction that will avoid an absurd result." State v. Paciorek, 137 ldaho 629, 
632, 51 P.3d 443, 446 (Ct. App. 2002). To the extent the Court must determine 
the legislative intent underlying the statute, it must "examine not only the literal 
words of the statute, but also the context of those words, the public policy behind 
the statute, and any pertinent legislative history." Id. 
There are several statutes applicable to an officer's statutory authority to 
conduct a traffic stop. The first of these, ldaho Code !j 50-209, provides: 
The policemen of every city ... shall have power to arrest all 
offenders against the law of the state, or of the city .... Whenever 
such policemen shall be in fresh pursuit of any offender against the 
law of the state, including traffic infractions, or of the city and the 
offense has been committed within the corporate limits of such city, 
such policemen, while in such fresh pursuit may go beyond the 
corporate or geographical limits of such city subject to the 
pivfisions of chapter 7, title 49, Idaho Code, fo i  the purpose af 
making such arrest or citation. 
The statute cited by the magistrate, ldaho Code § 67-2337, provides: 
All authority that applies to peace officers when performing their 
assigned functions and duties within the territorial limits of the 
respective city or political subdivisions, where they are employed, 
shall apply to them outside such territorial limits to the same degree 
and extent only when any one (1) of the following conditions exist: 
... (c) When the peace officer is in fresh pursuit as defined in and 
pursuant to chapter 7, title 19, ldaho Code. 
Thus, both provisions explicitly state that city police officers have authority to 
conduct traffic stops for infractions whenever they are in "fresh pursuit" as set 
forth in chapter 7 of title 19 of the ldaho Code. 
Chapter 7 of title 19 is entitled "Fresh Pursuit Law" and contains the 
following: 
Any police officer of this state in fresh pursuit of a person who is 
reasonably believed by him to have committed a ... traffic infraction 
in this state in the presence of such officer ... shall have authority to 
pursue, arrest and hold in custody or cite such person anywhere in 
this state. 
I.C. § 19-701A. "Fresh Pursuit" is defined as follows: 
The term "fresh pursuit" as used in this act shall include fresh 
pursuit as defined by the common law, and also the pursuit of a 
person who has committed a felony or who is reasonably 
suspected of having committed a felony. It shall also include the 
pursuit of a person suspected of having committed a supposed 
felony, though no felony has actually been committed, if there is 
reasonable ground for believing that a felony has been committed. 
Fresh pursuif as used herein shall not necessarily imply instant 
pursuif, but pursuit wifhout unreasonable delay. 
I.C. 5 19-705 (emphasis added). 
Under the plain and unambiguous language of the applicable statutes the 
question before the magistrate was whether Officer Hagstrom began his pursuit 
of Scott without unreasonable delay. The facts show that he clearly did. There is 
no evidence of delay whatsoever. Officer Hagstrom immediately began following 
Scott with the intent to pull him over 
The magistrate was concerned that Officer Hagstrom delayed turning on 
his lights until both he and Scott were outside the city limits. (R., pp. 48-49.) The 
court held that the officer was not "pursuing" Scott until he activated his lights, 
and because he physically could have activated his lights while both were in the 
city limits there was no "fresh pursuit." (R., p. 48.) This is error because the 
plain language of the statute says nothing about lights being part of a fresh 
pursuit. Presumably, for example, the common law adopted by the statute had 
nothing to say about lights on police cars, considering the common law would 
have arisen when transportation was limited to horses or vehicles drawn by 
horses. Nor does the more modern statutory provision say anything about lights, 
instead providing that the touchstone of "fresh pursuit" is "pursuit without 
unreasonable delay." I.C. 3 19-705. 
Other jurisdictions to consider this matter under the common law or 
identically or similarly worded statutes have reached the opposite conclusion as 
reached by the magistrate in this case. This case is very similar to that of Pass 
v. State, 305 S.E.2d 884 (Ga. App. 1983). In that case city officers saw a vehicle 
run off the road, return to the road, then cross the center line. The officers turned 
their vehicle to follow the suspect car, but two other cars on the road delayed 
them. They caught up to the car within the city limits, but elected not to activate 
their overhead lights because of a curve in the road, which would have made 
pulling over dangerous. Both of the vehicles were outside the city limits when the 
officers activated their lights and detained Poss. a at 885-86. Poss claimed 
that there was no "hot pursuit" under the facts, including that the officers 
"pursued him at the moderate speed of 45 mph, that he was not exceeding the 
speed limit, and that, at one point, the officers temporarily lost sight of appellant's 
vehicle." Id. at 886. 
The Georgia court rejected this argument stating, "the critical elements 
characterizing 'hot pursuit' are the continuity and immediacy of the pursuit, rather 
than the rate of speed at which the pursuit is made." Id. In addressing the 
officers' decision to not speed after Poss and to activate their lights only after the 
curve in the road, the court stated: "Reason compels the conclusion that the 
doctrine of 'hot pursuit' authorized the officers to pursue appellant and to stop 
and arrest him at the first opportunity for doing so that was, under the 
circumstances, safe for all concerned - appellant, the officers and other 
motorists." Id. (emphasis original). Likewise, Officer Hagstrom's decision to not 
activate his lights until he had closed the distance between his and Scott's 
vehicle did not mean there was no pursuit, that the pursuit was not "fresh," or that 
he acted with unreasonable delay. 
In United States v. Bisho~, 530 F.2d 1156 (5" Cir. 1976), bank employees 
included a tracking device in money stolen during a robbery. Very shortly after 
the robbery the police were able to track the device to a location outside of the 
city where they pulled over a car, in which was Bishop with the money. Id. at 
1157. Even though there is no indication that police so much as saw the car until 
they were outside the city limits, the Fifth Circuit had no problem concluding they 
were in "close pursuit." 
Other cases have also supported fresh pursuit where there was no 
indication whatsoever that the officers were trying to detain the suspect before he 
crossed a jurisdictional boundary. In Bost v. State, 958 A.2d 356 (Md. 2008), the 
defendant crossed the street upon seeing police. The officers, who had 
reasonable articulable suspicion to detain him based on his unprovoked flight, 
were in fresh pursuit when they ran after him on foot, crossing into Maryland from 
the District of Colombia, and then physically restraining him. There is no 
indication in the opinion that the officers used lights or any other means of 
stopping the defendant other than chasing him. In State v. Nysus, 35 P.3d 993 
(N.M. App. 2001), a detective for a university police force in plainclothes and an 
unmarked vehicle properly engaged in fresh pursuit where he tailed a suspect 
from the campus until a uniformed officer from same police force could conduct a 
stop in a neighboring city and off campus. In neither of these cases was there a 
requirement, either express or implied, of a display of lights by officers within the 
physical boundaries of their jurisdictions before their actions could be deemed 
fresh pursuit. 
The magistrate's conclusion that the statute required activation of lights 
within the city boundaries before the officer's conduct could be considered "fresh 
pursuit" simply finds no support in the statute. Because the magistrate erred as a 
matter of law when it concluded that the officer was not in fresh pursuit, the 
district court erred when it affirmed the suppression order. 
D. Even If There Were A Statutorv Violation, Such Would Not Require 
Suppression Of Evidence 
The magistrate and district courts also erred by suppressing even though 
neither found a constitutional violation. "Although exclusion is the proper remedy 
for some violations of the Fourth Amendment, there is no exclusionary rule 
generally applicable to statutory violations." United States v. Abdi, 463 F.3d 547, 
556 (6th Cir. 2006) (citing Sanchez-Llamas v. Oreqon, 548 U.S. 331, 346-48 
(2006)); see also United States v. Smith, 196 F.3d 1034, 1040 (9th Cir. 1999) 
("The use of the exclusionary rule is an exceptional remedy typically reserved for 
violations of constitutional rights."); United States v. Hensel, 699 F.2d 18, 29 (1st 
Cir. 1983) (rejecting suppression as a remedy for a treaty violation because the 
exclusionary rule "was not fashioned to vindicate a broad, general right to be free 
of agency action not 'authorized' by law, but rather to protect certain specific, 
constitutionally protected rights of individuals."); United States v. Mason, 52 F.3d 
1286, 1289 n.5 (4th Cir. 1995) (holding a statutory violation insufficient to justify 
imposition of the exclusionary rule, absent an underlying constitutional violation 
or right). Application of the exclusionary rule is, therefore, "an appropriate 
sanction for a statutory violation only where the statute specifically provides for 
suppression as a remedy or the statutory violation implicates underlying 
constitutional rights such as the right to be free from unreasonable search and 
seizure." &, 463 F.3d at 556; United States v. Thom~son, 936 F.2d 1249, 
1251 (1 1th Cir.1991) (holding a statutory violation insufficient to justify application 
of the exclusionary rule, absent an underlying constitutional violation or right or 
evidence that Congress intended exclusion as a remedy); United States v. 
Benevento, 836 F.2d 60, 69 (2d Cir. 1987) (same); United States v. Kinqton, 801 
F.2d 733, 737 (5th Cir. 1986) (same) (citing Sanchez-Llamas, 548 U.S. at 345- 
51) (finding that suppression is not an appropriate remedy for violation of Article 
36 of the Vienna Convention); United States v. Donovan, 429 U.S. 413, 432 n.22 
(1977) (denying exclusion for violation of wiretapping statute, 18 U.S.C. 5 2518); 
United States v. Meriwether, 917 F.2d 955, 960 (6th Cir.1990) (holding that 
government violations of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act do not 
warrant suppression of evidence). 
The legislature has not provided for suppression as a remedy for a 
violation of the "fresh pursuit" law set forth in I.C. § 19-701A. On the contrary, 
there is reason to believe that the legislature affirmatively rejected suppression 
as a remedy for any violation. "Section 1 of this act shall not be construed so as 
to make unlawful any arrest in this state which would otherwise be lawful." I.C. 3 
19-703. By this plain language the legislature has declared that an otherwise 
proper arrest is not rendered improper for failure to comply with the "fresh 
pursuit" requirement. There is nothing in the statute that would indicate the 
legislature intended exclusion of evidence to be a proper remedy for a traffic stop 
that did not comply with the "fresh pursuit" requirement. Thus, the courts below 
erred in granting this remedy. 
Although the lower courts found no constitutional violation, and therefore 
there is no constitutional violation to consider on appeal, it is important to point 
out that a violation of a state law related to arrest does not rise to the level of 
constitutional significance. In Vir~inia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164, 128 S.Ct. 1598 
(2008), police officers stopped a car driven by Moore. The officers arrested 
Moore for driving on a suspended license, a misdemeanor. Id. at -, 128 S.Ct. 
at 1601. In a search incident to that arrest the officers found crack cocaine. Id. 
at -, 128 S.Ct. at 1601-02. Moore moved to suppress the evidence resulting 
from the search by claiming that, under Virginia law, the offense for which he was 
arrested was only citable, and therefore the arrest was illegal. Id. at , 128 
S.Ct. at 1602. The Virginia Supreme Court reversed Moore's conviction, 
reasoning that Moore's arrest was illegal under state law, and therefore the 
search incident to arrest was invalid under the Fourth Amendment. Id. at -, 
128 S.Ct. at 1602. 
After concluding that historical context did not answer this question, the 
Supreme Court of the United States first noted that its precedent under the 
Fourth Amendment had declared that an arrest based on probable cause was 
constitutionally reasonable, and that state law regarding searches and seizures 
did not change this calculus. Id. at -, 128 S.Ct. at 1604-05. The Court noted 
that attaching a federal remedy to a state law violation would thwart states in 
setting their own policies by mandating suppression when the state itself did not. 
Id. a t ,  128 S.Ct. at 1605-06. Basing the constitutional reasonableness of -
state actions on state standards would create a vague and unpredictable 
constitutional standard. !&. at -, 128 S.Ct at 1606-07. It was also undesirable 
to have a constitutional standard that would vary from place to place and time to 
time. a a t ,  128 S.Ct. at 1607. "We conclude that warrantless arrests for 
crimes committed in the presence of an arresting officer are reasonable under 
the Constitution, and that while states are free to regulate such arrests however 
they desire, state restrictions do not alter the Fourth Amendment's protections." 
Id. at -, 128 S.Ct. at 1607. Having found the arrest lawful under the -
Constitutional standards for arrest, the Court also rejected the argument that the 
search incident to arrest was unreasonable because the arrest was "unlawful" 
under state law. Id. at -, 128 S.Ct. at 1607-08. 
Likewise, in State v. Benefiel, 131 ldaho 226, 953 P.2d 976 (1998), the 
ldaho Supreme Court rejected the claim that suppression of evidence is an 
appropriate remedy where an officer acts outside the physical boundaries of his 
jurisdiction but does not act unconstitutionally. In that case an officer of the 
Bureau of Indian Affairs, while off of the tribal reservation, saw Benefiel driving in 
a way that gave him reason to believe he was driving under the influence on an 
ldaho state highway. fd. at 227, 953 P.2d at 977. The officer stopped Benefiel, 
made contact with him, and, when he discovered additional evidence of DUI 
called in an ISP officer. Id. Benefiel argued that the officer lacked authority to 
stop him. fd. at 228, 953 P.2d at 978. This Court, however, found that to be 
irrelevant. fd. Because the stop was supported by reasonable suspicion, and 
therefore met constitutional standards, there was no violation of Benefiel's 
constitutional rights and therefore no suppression. Id. at 229, 953 P.2d at 979. 
The analysis of the Supreme Court of the United States in Moore and the 
conclusion of the ldaho Supreme Court in Benefiel apply here. A traffic stop is 
constitutionally justified upon reasonable suspicion of a traffic violation. State v. 
Galleqos, 120 ldaho 894, 896, 821 P.2d 949,951 (1991); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 
1 (1968). There is no dispute in this case that the stop was based on reasonable 
suspicion. Thus, in this case the stop was constitutionally reasonable regardless 
of whether there was compliance with I.C. 5 19-701A. Benefiel, 131 ldaho at 
229, 953 P.2d at 979. As in m, the state law did not alter the constitutional 
standard of reasonableness. 
As shown above, Officer Hagstrom did comply with state law when he 
conducted the traffic stop of Scott. Even if he did not, however, Scott was not 
entitled to suppression for violation of a state law and there was no constitutional 
violation because the stop was supported by reasonable suspicion Scott had 
committed a speeding infraction. Thus, the magistrate erred in suppressing the 
evidence and the district court erred on appeal by affirming the suppression. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests this Court to reverse the district court's 
appellate decision and reverse the magistrate's suppression order and remand 
for further proceedings on the DUI charge. 
DATED this 8th day of April 2010. 
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